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Could it be the case that if I am right my opponents will be pleased ? A 








I take up the four issues considered by Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto in their 
reply to Politzer (2007). Based on the conceptual clarification which they 
adduce, it seems that the disagreement can be settled about the first one (truth 
functionality) and can be attenuated about the second one (the paradoxes of 
material implication). However, I maintain and refine my criticisms on the last 
two (negation and the probability of conditionals), backed up by considerations 
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1 Introduction 
 
In their reply to my review and critical appraisal of the psychological theories of 
reasoning with conditionals (Politzer, 2007), Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto 
(henceforth JLBG) consider four main issues. These are truth functionality, the 
paradoxes of material implication, negation and the probability of conditionals. I 
take up these points in turn and finish with some comments made from the 




I believe that the debate is relatively minor and stems from the lack of 
availability of a specific expression to label the mental model theory (MM 
theory). The meaning of a conditional sentence refers to a set of possibilities –in 
fact ten different sets after modulation (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). 
Because each of these sets can be mapped one-to-one on a truth table they 
can be described in terms of truth value (even though the input is not a truth 
value but an intensional representation). But the important point which should 
close the debate is that these sets of possibilities are not determined by 
compositionality (as truth-functionality would require) but by semantic and 
pragmatic modulation. It may, however, be worth pointing out that in case the 
operation of modulation leaves the core meaning unaltered, the possibilities of 
the "conditional interpretation" (one of the ten sets) can still be described in 
terms of truth value as a material conditional.    
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3. The paradoxes 
 
JLBG write (p 10 of manuscript): 
if the conclusion of a valid inference throws information away by adding a 
disjunctive alternative to the possibilities consistent with the premises, then 
it should be odd, and individuals should balk at it. The challenge to critics is 
to find a counterexample. 
At first sight, based on this formulation, a counterexample, which they challenge 
critics to show, suggests itself, and this is modus ponens. The premises of MP 
(A  C and A) are equivalent to A&C. The conclusion C is equivalent to 
(A&C) v (&C), so that a rewriting of MP is: A&C / (A&C) v (&C) where the 
second disjunct does throw out semantic information by adding a disjunct to the 
single possibility consistent with the premise. This illustrates that there are 
always at least as many logical possibilities in the conclusion as there are in the 
premises of any valid deduction (and there are exactly as many in case of an 
identity). But here is the origin of the debate: the possibilities that are 
considered by JLBG are psychological possibilities (Johnson-Laird, personnal 
communication), that is, mental models. The rewriting of modus ponens should 
now be [a   c] for the premise and [ c ] for the conclusion (without development) 
which shows that no disjunct is added to the possibility consistent with the 
premise. In brief, there is ambiguity in JLBG's use of "possibility"; after 
disambiguation, my objection and counterexample do not hold any more.  
 There is, however, more to discuss about the paradoxes of thematerial 
conditional. If JLBG's explanation of the paradoxes is right, two inferences that 
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can be described by the same sets of possibilities should produce similar 
estimates of acceptability. Consider the following inferences (from Johnson-
Laird and Byrne, 2002):  
There isn't a circle; therefore, if there is a circle then there is triangle 
and its logically equivalent disjunctive formulation,  
There isn't a circle; therefore, there is not a circle or there is triangle.  
Are both equally rejected? If one considers only the forward inferences (when 
the conclusion is to be discovered or evaluated, as is usually the case in 
experiments), intuition seems to confirm the MM claim: both are odd. Now 
compare the backward inferences in dialogues D1 and D2: 
(D1) Peter: There isn't a circle or there is a triangle 
Mary (who has got evidence): You are right: There isn't a circle. 
Mary has offered a convincing reason that justifies the truth of Peter's assertion 
and this is based on the validity of the argument, which is fully accepted.  
(D2) Peter: If there is a circle then there is a triangle 
Mary (who has got evidence): You are right: There isn't a circle. 
Now Mary has offered an intuitively opaque and unconvincing reason, and her 
argument seems as odd as its forward counterpart. Notice that one cannot 
object some specificity pertaining to the backward inference because this 
should apply equally to the conditional and the disjunctive inferences. The result 
of this comparison is twofold: one, contrary to the MM claim, there is something 
specific to if in the oddity of the paradoxes, and two, the analysis of the 
paradoxes in terms of sets of possibilities offers a necessary but not sufficient 
condition.  
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4. The negation of conditional sentences 
   
Why do individuals tend to deny conditional sentences if A, C by if A, not C 
rather than by A and not C (an expression of the impossible case)? JLBG have 
a straightforward explanation: Negation, like other operators, has a tendency to 
apply to the main clause, so that neg(A C) is interpreted as A neg C. So, 
individuals are incorrect because the resulting sentence and the initial one 
cannot contradict each other. In addition, it is claimed that a better task to reveal 
the correct negation is to ask what is impossible. I discuss these claims in turn. 
 The negation lowering explanation is worth considering as it is 
parcimonious and linguistically documented. But it answers only part of the 
question while failing to account for a basic psychological phenomenon. It 
proposes an explanation for the choice of if A, not C, but not for the near 
absence of A and not C. This is all the more puzzling as [A   C] is the explicit, 
and presumably more accessible model for if A, not-C. But even if this could be 
explained, the hypothesis does not account for linguistic intuition. When one 
considers how to deny a sentence such as if it rains, the match will be canceled, 
the sentence if it rains, the match will not be canceled meets the expectations of 
many people, whereas it will rain and the match will not be canceled sounds 
anomalous and seems to miss something semantically essential. This is the 
basic phenomenon which an adequate theory should explain and which the 
negation lowering hypothesis fails to do. An explanation will be proposed below.  
Besides this shortcoming, the syntactic explanation is made at an 
exorbitant cost for the plausibility of MM theory. It is claimed that individuals 
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who negate a conditional sentence by if A, not C are incorrect because the 
resulting sentence has a possibility in common with the initial sentence (in fact, 
two possibilities, those when A is false), which means that the two sentences 
cannot contradict each other. It is uncontroversial that negation is a demanding 
operation. But could it be so demanding that individuals usually fail to correctly 
negate one of the most basic types of sentences they produce and understand 
in their daily life? Of course, individuals commit fallacies occasionally; but the 
error attributed to them by JLBG is systematic and, presumably, universal as 
everybody uses such denials in daily life. Individuals who routinely make 
incorrect negation are bound to be inconsistent, so that communication would 
usually fail. But this is not the case. As I will show below, individuals use 
negated conditionals to convey a whole range of nuances in a refined way.  
 JLBG claim that to reveal negation of if A, C, it is more appropriate to ask 
reasoners what is impossible given if A, C than to ask them to negate the 
sentence. The individuals' capability to represent A and not C as a 
counterexample to a conditional sentence if A, C is not a matter of debate: 
presumably all theories agree on this. Because this is what the "impossible" 
task tests, the results do not support the MM theory any more than other 
theories. 
 
5. The probability of conditionals 
 
Space now allows an explanation of why I found Girotto & Johnson-Laird's 
(2004) interpretation of their experiments on the probability of conditional 
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sentences debatable. One, there is a problem of validity. Participants face 
mathematical problems that belong to the domain of probability. Except for one 
problem in which the probability space is particularly simple, a combinatorial 
analysis is required before the ratio of probabilities is computed. This is a task in 
which participants must use technical skills or concepts of probability to 
succeed, far away from the intuitive judgment of how likely is a consequent 
given an antecedent for conditionals of daily life, so that what is tested is a 
confounding of mathematical skills and of the comprehension of the question. 
The high frequency of unexpected answers by whichever theory and the low 
level of performance on the first two problems clearly support this view. Two, 
the rationale for the conjunctive strategy is missing. No reason is offered why, 
when individuals are able to envisage all the possibilities consistent with the 
conditional, there are individuals who fail to treat this sentence as true in these 
possibilities (that is, why they fail to adopt the "complete" strategy). The data 
show hardly any evidence of the operation of the "complete" strategy (even 
though it is motivated) but the conjunctive strategy (that is unmotivated) occurs 
one third of the time on the average.  
The major current approach to the probability of the conditionals is based 
on the notion, fully developed by Adams (1975), that the probability of a 
conditional sentence is the conditional probability of its consequent on its 
antecedent (pCA, the PCasCP hypothesis). JLBG's have three misgivings with 
the PCasCP hypothesis. One concerns the paraphrase of the conditional with a 
disjunction (their probabilities differ). They take for granted individuals' capacity 
to paraphrase if A, C with not-A or C on the basis of the results of Richardson 
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and Ormerod (1997). But the methodology is flawed for, in all likelihood, 
participants learnt the experimenters' transparent objective through repeated 
measures. In addition, the problem is far more subtle because probabilistic 
logics predict that it is valid to infer from if A, C to not-A or C, but not always in 
the reverse direction, and crucially, the validity of the latter depends on the 
specific values of pA and pC. So, carefully controlled experiments are required. 
There are, however, seminal observations made by Fillenbaum (1978) using a 
free production task. This showed participants' general low level of paraphrases 
by or (possibly due to the lack of examples in the instructions, a defect in the 
opposite direction). But there is an interesting result: there was a notable 
exception for two specific relations (logical truths and threats). As noted by 
JLBG, p(AvC) differs from pCA: the latter is smaller, except in the case of 
certainty where both equal 1. Now, it is remarkable that these two cases where 
the numerical equivalence is uncontroversial are precisely those where the 
conditional aims to convey full belief, whether in the expression of a logical truth 
or in the expression of a threat; in the latter case the certainty for the hearer that 
the consequent will be executed by the speaker is essential for the speech act 
to have perlocutionary force. 
Two, in support of their view they accept the results of Schroyens, 
Schaeken and Dieussaert (2008) showing that the material conditional 
interpretation can be boosted by appropriate priming manipulations: attracting 
the attention to the possibility of the non-A cases results in greater chance that 
these cases will be incorporated in the calculation of the probability of the 
statement's truth, leading to the material conditional. But this result does not 
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constitute evidence against a probabilistic view. Naïve reasoners do express 
conditionals that converge with the material conditional. The sentence if these 
two numbers are consecutive, their sum is odd  expresses a mathematical truth 
uttered with certainty (pCA = 1). It is a limiting case where the probabilistic 
import dissolves into certainty and which can receive a material conditional 
interpretation. The material conditional is teacheable to some extent 
(painstakingly, as math and logic teachers experience daily); it may become 
more or les available in the individual's metacognitive equipment, depending on 
the kind of formal education they receive. Training can also be attempted in an 
experimental setting but this is a hard enterprise, like in the Schroyens et al. 
study where the effect size amounted to an increase of about 10% and did not 
even reach significance in the second experiment.  
Three, is conditional probability at the border of  individuals' 
competence? They often err in tasks that require mathematical computation, 
that is, they have difficulty understanding the formal concept. In daily life, where 
conditional probabilities are pervasive, there are two common kinds of mistake. 
One is the confusion of pYX with pXY, which the formula explains: this may 
occur when, for pragmatic reasons, the "sample space" (X) is identified with the 
whole universe. The other is the confusion, mentioned by JLBG, between pYX 
and pXY which is well documented (e.g., Sherman et al., 1992) and again 
accounted for by the formulas pYX = pXY / pX, and p XY = pXY / pY, 
showing that crucially they share the common term pXY but differ by their 
sample spaces. Now context and/or saliency may suggest focusing on one 
sample or the other, a potential source of mistake akin to figure-ground effect. 
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This is not specific to probability but affects also the expressions of frequency 
and proportion. For instance, I have repeatedly observed in classes of statistics 
that a phrase such as "the proportion of girls in the Science stream" is deeply 
ambiguous. It tends to be interpreted relatively more often as the ratio of girls to 
all the students in the Science stream (implicit contrast: boys) or as the ratio of 
female Science students to all female students (implicit contrast: non-Science 
stream), depending on how the topic is manipulated, e. g., gender versus 
professional prospect. In brief, (i) here again natural language is imperfect to 
convey mathematical --as well as logical-- concepts, and (ii) the formal, 
metacognitive concept is hard.  But it would be a deep epistemological mistake 
to reject (or accept) the theorist's modelling on the basis of naïve subject's 
difficulty (or ease) in understanding the concepts and calculations that 
constitute the theorist's abstract model: these are at two different levels of 
analysis. (This remark also applies to the conclusions one might wish to draw, 
in whichever direction, from the Schroyens et al. study). 
 
6. The probabilistic view 
 
Politzer's review (2007) focused essentially on the two approaches to deduction 
that have been the most influential and also the most debated since the late 
1970s (mental rules and mental models). They were developed to investigate 
individuals' performance in formal reasoning, which many thought to be the 
main, if not unique, test of human rationality. In recent years, there has been a 
major shift of interest towards tasks ecologically valid that take into account the 
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uncertainty of the premises. This basic characteristic of human reasoning was 
entirely neglected and only recently has a new look on conditionals been 
adopted by some researchers (Liu, Lo and Wu, 1996, Oaksford, Chater, and 
Larkin, 2000; Evans, Handley and Over, 2003). The most recent psychological 
theory of conditionals (Evans and Over, 2004) adopts the Ramsey test as a 
psychological operation on which the meaning of if is based. The PCasCP 
hypothesis follows naturally from this view and so does the explanation of 
individuals' intuitions that have been mentioned earlier regarding the denial of 
conditionals.  
One major advantage of the PCasCP view is that it allows the 
representation of the uncertain status of the sentence and conveys its value. 
Now assuming that a speaker has asserted if A, C with full belief (pCA = 1), 
her interlocutor may wish to express disagreement based on various epistemic 
states. This does not aim to convey a logical negation (a contradiction): rather 
this challenges the assertability of the conditional sentence. Total disagreement 
(pCA = 0 ) or strong disagreement (pCA low ) can be expressed by if A, not 
C, which vindicates the correctness of negation lowering. But there are other 
nuances in the speaker's degree of belief that support an expression of 
disagreement: She may wish to convey only that p not-CA > pCA; this also 
can be expressed by if A, not C (but can be made more explicit by use of a 
modal, such as it is likely that if A, not C). Frequently, one may wish to convey a 
slight doubt about the conditional, that is, to alter belief from pCA = 1 down to 
a value slightly lower than 1. This is typically captured by modal expressions 
such as it is possible that if A, not C, or it is not certain that if A, C; as a variant, 
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one may wish to convey a reason for such a reduced belief, which is typically 
captured by unconditional modal expressions of the type it is possible that A 
and not C. In brief, the probabilistic view explains the use of common verbal 
expressions to deny conditionals, including the critical if A, not-C. The latter, far 
from being a systematic fallacy, is correctly understood by the interlocutors as a 
conditional denial, that is, an expression of dissent—itself uncertain--about the 
likelihood of C under the supposition that A holds, in other words, about the 
assertability of if A, C. 
Recently, Handley, Evans and Thompson (2006) asked participants 
presented with negated basic conditionals to judge what follows, what is 
possible and what is necessary; the results unambiguously supported the 
conditional probability prediction that for individuals nothing necessarily follows 
from a negated conditional. But supporters of MM theory might argue that the 
negated conditionals could not be interpreted as such because negation was 
given wide scope, so that the two approaches make the same predictions. In an 
unpublished pilot study, I have asked participants to deny future indicative 
conditionals such as if it rains, the match will be canceled, or if it's cloudy, it will 
rain. A speaker was supposed to have uttered the conditional sentence and the 
participants were asked to complete the dialogue by writing up the interlocutor's 
plausible reply prompted by "No...". By using this cue, the procedure invited 
participants to mentally deny the statement, which allowed them to generate the 
denial in their own words, without being imposed any syntactic construction. 
Importantly, they were not presented with a negated conditional sentence, 
which avoids the negation lowering objection. There was a rich variety of 
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expressions, but most of them could be classified into three groups of roughly 
equal frequency: One conditional, if A, not C; one modalised conditional: if A, it 
is possible that not-C/not necessary that C; and one modalised nonconditional 
(sometimes/ it is possible that A and not C). Significantly, there was not a single 
occurrence of categorical A and not C. Clearly, one cannot deny a conditional 
sentence by asserting a categorical sentence A and not C. This is because the 
speaker would forsake the suppositional import of the conditional, and this lies 
at the heart of individuals' linguistic intuition against such denials. There is one 
exception to this, namely when the speaker has knowledge that A has actually 
occurred (while C did not) in which case the suppositional status of A vanishes. 
This is well accounted for by the conditional probability view since a categorical 
assertion of A & not-C means p(A & not-C) = 1. But together with p not-CA = 1 
this requires pA = 1. Notice that this does not occur in case of a modal assertion 
of A & not-C which preserves the supposition by keeping pA < 1. In brief, 
uncertainty is pervasive: individuals generally reason with assumptions that 




In all likelihood, the question I raised in the title will be answered negatively by 
most individuals, that is, people (and presumably my opponents too) believe  
that if I am right, my opponents will not be pleased. If I were unwise enough to 
think that I have an apodeictic case, I could express a denial based on such a 
thought by I am right and my opponents will be not be pleased. Surprisingly, this 
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is also what, according to their theory, my opponents themselves must believe. 
But, obviously, this yields much more than what one expects their opponents to 
be willing to envisage or concede, which is only that if I am right they will not be 
pleased, without removing the suppositional import of the conditional. 
 As illustrated in sections 5 and 6, conditional sentences have an inherent 
probabilistic import. In addition, communication and inference is often, if not 
generally, carried out about uncertain assumptions (which includes the 
conditional's components). It follows that an adequate theory of conditionals –
whether at the semantic or the inferential level— should incorporate uncertainty, 
that is, have a means to represent degrees of belief and to explain how these 
propagate.  
The MM theory constitutes a great intellectual achievement. The part of 
the theory that deals with conditionals contains many deep insights, but from 
the viewpoint just mentioned it does not meet the expectations one might have. 
In its current state of development, it is basically focused on a bi-valued view of 
reasoning, whether in terms of possibilities or in terms of truth. The theory may, 
in principle, have the tools to develop a model of reasoning with uncertain 
premises (especially for deduction) that could apply also to conditionals. 
Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) state that models can be tagged with numerical 
probabilities but this proposal has not been exploited so far, nor has its 
feasibility or psychological plausibility established: let us hope to see these 
developments in the future. 
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